Complimented by a richly detailed chronology and a wealth of primary documents, these features help readers grasp both the broad contours of government efforts to fight poverty and the details and results of specific policies. Jyotsna Sreenivasan is a professional writer.
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- The American Middle Class: An Economic Encyclopedia of Progress and Poverty - Greenwood - ABC-CLIO.
She is also the author of three children's books and her short fiction has been published in numerous literary magazines. The essays cover policy directives, legislations, important individuals, organizations, and concepts, including, to name just a few, the Black Panther Party, child abuse and poverty, the Civil Rights Movement, Eugene Debs, the earned income tax credit, the Family and Medical Leave Act, homeless shelters, Herbert Hoover, the Indian New Deal, labor unions, living-wage laws, Huey Long, the National Labor Relations Act, private charity, Margaret Sanger, segregation laws, teen pregnancy prevention, and vouchers.
Also included are introductory essays describing poverty responses at the levels of local, state, federal, and tribal governments. Lower-level undergraduates and above; general readers. I can certainly commend this book as a workmanlike addition to the library shelves Libraries Unlimited.
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Journals Babones, S. Quadrant , 61 3 , Social Indicators Research , , Interpretive Quantitative Methods for the Social Sciences. Sociology , 50 3 , Quadrant , 60 10 , Russia's Eastern Gambit. Russia in Global Affairs , 3, The Once and Future Hegemon. The National Interest , , What is world-systems analysis? Distinguishing theory from perspective. Thesis Eleven , 1 , Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs , 2 1 , Oriental Institute Journal , 24 2 , Geopolitics , 18 3 , Austerity Economics and the Threat to Human Infrastructure.
Peace Review , 25 4 , Comparative Sociology , 12 2 , A structuralist perspective on economic growth in China and India: anticipating the end game. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy , 32 1 , Indices of Trade Partner Concentration for Countries, Journal of World-Systems Research , 18 2 , Peace Review , 24 1 , Population Review , 50 2 , Foreign Affairs , 90 5 , Income, education, and class gradients in health in global perspective. Health Sociology Review , 19 1 , The Globalization Challenge to Population Health.
International Review of Modern Sociology , 36 2 , Trade globalization, economic development and the importance of education-as-knowledge. Journal of Sociology , 46 1 , Journal of World-Systems Research , 15 1 , Public Health , 2 , Journal of Sociology , 45 1 , International Review of Modern Sociology , 36, Social Science and Medicine , 66 7 , Michigan Sociological Review , 21, Sociological Inquiry , 77 1 , The political economy of polarized pluralism. Party Politics , 13 1 , Journal of World-Systems Research , 11 1 , Legitimate authority, on this view, differs from merely effective or de facto authority in that it actually holds the right to rule and creates political obligations e.
Raz On some views, even legitimate authority is not sufficient to create political obligations. The thought is that a political authority such as a state may be permitted to issue commands that citizens are not obligated to obey Dworkin Based on a view of this sort, some have argued that legitimate political authority only gives rise to political obligations if additional normative conditions are satisfied e. Wellman ; Edmundson ; Buchanan There is sometimes a tendency in the literature to equate the normative concept of legitimacy with justice.
Some explicitly define legitimacy as a criterion of minimal justice e.
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Hampton ; Buchanan Unfortunately, there is sometimes also a tendency to blur the distinction between the two concepts, and a lot of confusion arises from that. Someone might claim, for example, that while political authorities such as states are often unjust, only a just state is morally acceptable and legitimate in this sense. The emerging literature on realist political theory criticizes this tendency to blur the distinction between legitimacy and justice e.
Rawls , clearly distinguishes between the two concepts, of course. In his view, while justice and legitimacy are related—they draw on the same set of political values—they have different domains and legitimacy makes weaker demands than justice ; ff. A state may be legitimate but unjust, but the converse is not possible. Pettit ff distinguishes more sharply between the two concepts. According to Pettit, a state is just if it imposes a social order that promotes freedom as non-domination for all its citizens. It is legitimate if it imposes a social order in an appropriate way. A state that fails to impose a social order in an appropriate way, however just the social order may be, is illegitimate.
Vice versa, a legitimate state may fail to impose a just social order.
The American Middle Class
Political realists also lend support to those who have questioned any sharp distinction between descriptive and normative concepts of legitimacy e. Habermas ; Beetham ; Horton The objection to a strictly normative concept of legitimacy is that it is of only limited use in understanding actual processes of legitimation.
The charge is that philosophers tend to focus too much on the general conditions necessary for the justification of political institutions, but neglect the historical actualization of the justificatory process. This section lays out the different ways in which legitimacy, understood normatively, can be seen as relating to political authority, coercion, and political obligations.
The normative concept of political legitimacy is often seen as related to the justification of authority. The main function of political legitimacy, on this interpretation, is to explain the difference between merely effective or de facto authority and legitimate authority. John Locke put forward such an interpretation of legitimacy. The solution to this problem is a social contract that transfers political authority to a civil state that can realize and secure the natural law. According to Locke, and contrary to his predecessor Thomas Hobbes, the social contract thus does not create authority.
Political authority is embodied in individuals and pre-exists in the state of nature. The social contract transfers the authority they each enjoy in the state of nature to a particular political body.
Poverty in the United States: An Encyclopedia of History, Politics, and Policy - ABC-CLIO
While political authority thus pre-exists in the state of nature, legitimacy is a concept that is specific to the civil state. Because the criterion of legitimacy that Locke proposes is historical, however, what counts as legitimate authority remains connected to the state of nature. The legitimacy of political authority in the civil state depends, according to Locke, on whether the transfer of authority has happened in the right way. Although Locke emphasises consent, consent is not, however, sufficient for legitimate authority because an authority that suspends the natural law is necessarily illegitimate e.
Simmons On some interpretations of Locke e.
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Pitkin , consent is not even necessary for legitimate political authority; it is only a marker of illegitimacy. Whether an actual political regime respects the constraints of the natural law is thus at least one factor that determines its legitimacy. This criterion of legitimacy is negative: it offers an account of when effective authority ceases to be legitimate. When a political authority fails to secure consent or oversteps the boundaries of the natural law, it ceases to be legitimate and, therefore, there is no longer an obligation to obey its commands.
For Locke—unlike for Hobbes—political authority can thus not be absolute. John Simmons uses them to argue that we should distinguish between the moral justification of states in general and the political legitimacy of actual states.
An Economic Encyclopedia of Progress and Poverty
I will come back to this point in section 3. Joseph Raz links legitimacy to the justification of political authority. According to Raz, political authority is just a special case of the more general concept of authority , , He defines authority in relation to a claim—of a person or an agency—to generate what he calls pre-emptive reasons.
Such reasons replace other reasons for action that people might have. For example, if a teacher asks her students to do some homework, she expects her say-so to give the students reason to do the homework. Authority is effective, on this view, if it gets people to act on the reasons it generates. There are limits to what even a legitimate authority can rightfully order others to do, which is why it does not necessarily replace all relevant reasons.
When is effective or de facto authority legitimate? In other words, what determines whether the pre-emption thesis is satisfied? The normal justification thesis explains why those governed by a legitimate authority ought to treat its directives as binding. It thus follows as a corollary of the normal justification thesis that such an authority generates a duty to be obeyed. Note that even though legitimate authority is defined as a special case of effective authority, only the former is appropriately described as a serving its subjects.
Illegitimate—but effective—authority does not serve those it aims to govern, although it may purport to do so. The idea expressed by the warranty thesis is that legitimacy morally justifies an independently existing authority such that the claims of the authority become moral obligations.
Those who link political legitimacy to the problem of justifying authority tend to think of political coercion as only a means that legitimate states may use to secure their authority. According to a second important interpretation, by contrast, the main function of legitimacy is precisely to justify coercive power. For an excellent discussion of the two interpretations of legitimacy and a defense of the coercion-based interpretation, see Ripstein ; see also Hampton On coercion-based interpretations, the main problem that a conception of legitimacy aims to solve is how to distinguish the rightful use of political power from mere coercion.
One way to capture the thought is that, on these views, legitimacy relates to the way in which the rightful use of political power creates or constitutes political authority. Again, there are different ways in which this idea might be understood. Both manners of creating a sovereign are equally legitimate. And political authority will be legitimate as long as the sovereign ensures the protection of the citizens, as Hobbes believes that the natural right to self-preservation cannot be relinquished Leviathan , chapter Beyond that, however, there can be no further questions about the legitimacy of the sovereign.
Another way in which the relation between legitimacy and the creation of authority may be understood is that the attempt to rule without legitimacy is an attempt to exercise coercive power—not authority. Rousseau contrasts a legitimate social order with a system of rules that is merely the expression of power. Coercive power is primarily a feature of the civil state. While there are some forms of coercive power even in the state of nature—for example the power of parents over their children—Rousseau assumes that harmful coercive power arises primarily in the civil state and that this creates the problem of legitimacy.
Such a state would be legitimate. Legitimate political authority is created by convention, reached within the civil state.
Specifically, Rousseau suggests that legitimacy arises from the democratic justification of the laws of the civil state Social Contract I:6; cf. For Kant, as for Hobbes, political authority is created by the establishment of political institutions in the civil state. It does not pre-exist in individuals in the state of nature. What exists in the pre-civil social state, according to Kant, is the moral authority of each individual qua rational being and a moral obligation to form a civil state.
It helps people conform to certain rules by eliminating what today would be called the free-riding problem or the problem of partial compliance. The civil state, according to Kant, establishes the rights necessary to secure equal freedom.